




Sovereign	 indebtedness	 has	 been	 approached	 from	 a	 twofold	 approach	 in	 the	
international	 law	 literature.	 The	 first,	 championed	 by	 international	 finance	
scholars,	posits	no	questions	as	regards	the	legality	of	the	debt	and	concentrates	
on	debt	management,	chiefly,	 if	not	exclusively,	as	engineered	by	lending	states	
and	 international	 financial	 institutions	 (IFIs).1	The	 second	 approach	 examines	
the	origins	and	legality	of	sovereign	debt	and	its	adherents	comprise	both	human	
rights	 lawyers	as	well	as	general	public	 international	 law	scholars.2	It	 is	on	 the	
basis	 of	 the	 latter	 scholarship	 that	 the	 concept	 known	 as	 odious	 debt	 came	 to	
prominence.	
This	article,	although	inclined	towards	a	human	rights	stance,	is	cognizant	
of	 the	application	of	general	 international	 law	rules	 to	sovereign	 indebtedness,	
including	 international	 foreign	 investment	 law,	 in	 addition	 to	 international	
finance	law.	Indeed,	the	authors	do	not	assume	or	imply	that	all	debt	is	odious	or	
that	 it	 suffers	 from	 some	 form	 of	 illegitimacy	 or	 illegality	 under	 international	
law.	 That	 odious	 debt	 is	 detrimental	 to	 fundamental	 human	 rights	 has	 been	
described	 elsewhere.3	What	 is	 of	 interest	 here	 is	 an	 examination	 of	 the	 legal	
nature	of	odious	debt	as	a	claim	under	international	 law,	as	opposed	to	a	mere	
substantive	 entitlement.	 This	 allows	 us	 to	 further	 briefly	 investigate	 the	
existence	of	this	substantive	right	from	the	perspective	of	state	practice,	given	its	
absence	 in	 treaty	 law.4	The	 authors	 assess	 both	 the	 political	 and	 economic	
dimension	of	odiousness	in	order	to	demonstrate	that	it	is	not	simply	a	financing	





Press,	 2014);	 PS	 Kenadjan,	 KA	 Bauer	 and	 A	 Cahn	 (eds.),	 Collective	 Action	 Clauses	 and	 the
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first	 adjustment	 program	 with	 the	 Troika	 (European	 Commission,	 European	
Central	 Bank	 and	 IMF),	 the	 then	 President	 of	 the	 Hellenic	 Parliament,	
Zoe		 Konstantopoulou,	 established	 the	Truth	Committee	on	Public	Debt	 in	 April	
2015,	mandating	the	 investigation	 into	 the	 creation	 and	growth	of	 public	debt,	
the	 way	 and	 reasons	 for	 which	 debt	 was	 contracted,	 and	 the	 impact	 of	 the	
conditionalities	attached	to	the	loans	contracted	by	Greece	on	the	economy	and	
the	 population.	 The	 decision	 to	 set	 up	 the	 Committee	 was	 predicated	 on	
Regulation	(EU)	No.	472/2013	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	
21	May	 2013	 on	 the	 strengthening	 of	 economic	 and	 budgetary	 surveillance	 of	
Member	 States	 in	 the	 euro	 area	 experiencing	 or	 threatened	 with	 serious	
difficulties	 with	 respect	 to	 their	 financial	 stability,6	as	 well	 as	 the	 UN	 Guiding	
Principles	 on	 Foreign	 Debt	 and	 Human	 Rights7	The	 UN	 Guiding	 Principles	 call	
upon	states	to	undertake	periodic	audits	of	their	public	debts	in	order	to	ensure	
transparency	 and	 accountability	 in	 the	management	 of	 their	 resources	 and	 to	
inform	future	borrowing	decisions.	The	Committee	released	two	reports	(in	June	
and	September	2015),	which	demonstrated	 that	Greece’s	adjustment	programs	
were	motivated	 by	 political	 not	 financial/fiscal	 criteria.	 The	 technical	 exercise	
surrounding	 macroeconomic	 variables	 and	 debt	 projections,	 figures	 directly	
relating	 to	 people’s	 lives	 and	 livelihoods,	 has	 enabled	 discussions	 around	 the	
debt	 to	 remain	 at	 a	 technical	 level	mainly	 revolving	 around	 the	 argument	 that	










identified	 four	 types	 of	 odious	 debt,	 namely	 odious,	 illegal,	 illegitimate	 and	












8	The	Committee	was	 set	up	by	a	decision	of	 the	President	of	 the	Greek	Parliament	on	4	April	
2015.	 It	 issued	 its	 first	 preliminary	 report	 as	 Truth	 Committee	 on	 Public	 Debt,	 Preliminary	
Report	 (June	 2015),	 available	 at:	 http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/8158407a-fc31-
4ff2-a8d3-433701dbe6d4/Report_EN_final.pdf.	
function	 is	 a	 ‘sign-posting’	 one	 –	 because	 there	 exist	 alternative	 crimes	 under	
which	 the	 perpetrators	 may	 be	 charged,	 such	 a	 mass	 murder,	 extermination,	
grave	 breaches	 etc	 –	 there	 is	 no	 serious	 alternative	 to	 the	 types	 of	 claims	
encompassed	under	the	odious	debt	doctrine,	as	will	be	demonstrated	shortly.	
	 Given	 that	 the	 concept	 of	 odious	 debt	 (in	 its	 umbrella	 dimension)	 has	
until	recently	been	approached	from	academic	angles	and	was	characterized	as	a	
‘doctrine’,	 it	 is	not	surprising	that	its	practical	 legal	nature	has	been	given	little	
attention.	Of	course,	the	limited	practice	in	which	odious	debt	claims	have	been	







both	 treaty	 law	 (particularly	 as	 a	 result	 of	 its	 conflict	 with	 human	 rights	
obligations	 and	 self	 determination)	 as	 well	 as	 customary	 international	 law,10	
even	though	the	pertinent	state	practice	is	not	easily	discernible.11			
For	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	 section	 we	 shall	 assume	 that	 the	 entitlement	
against	 the	 accumulation	 of	 odious	 debt	 (whether	 contractually,	 trust-based,	
unilateral	or	other)	derives	 from	economic	and	 fiscal	 self-determination.12	This	
in	 turn	 belongs	 to	 peoples	 who	 go	 on	 to	 exercise	 it	 through	 elected	
representatives,	 typically	 in	 the	 form	of	government.	This	means	 that	 the	 right	
against	 the	 accumulation	of	 odious	debt	 is	 exempted	 from	 that	part	 of	 general	
international	 law	 whereby	 states	 are	 responsible	 for	 the	 acts	 of	 prior	
governments	(state	continuity	principle).	No	doubt,	 if	the	people	of	a	state	vote	
overwhelmingly	 in	 favor	 of	 a	 government	 or	 a	 policy	 that	 clearly	 produces	
odious	debt,	 this	outcome	may	not	subsequently	be	relied	upon	as	a	claim	that	
said	policy	contravened	the	right	to	economic	self-determination.	As	a	result,	if	a	
government	 were	 to	 enter	 into	 an	 agreement	 giving	 rise	 to	 odious,	 illegal	 or	
illegitimate	 debt,	 it	 would	 not	 only	 be	 breaching	 its	 constitutional	 and	 treaty	
obligations,	but	the	other	party	would	not	be	entitled	to	enforce	the	agreement	
with	 a	 subsequent	 government	 because	 of	 its	 unconscionable	 character.13	The	
	
9	One	of	the	leading	treatises	on	investment	claims,	for	example,	takes	the	concept	of	a	claim	to	be	




of	 EU	 Regulation	 472/2013	 of	 the	 Parliament	 and	 Council	 (21	May	 2013)	member	 states	 are	
under	an	obligation	to	undertake	debt	audits	of	their	public	finances.	Such	an	obligation	naturally	
requires	that	where	an	audit	reveals	serious	irregularities	in	the	accumulation	of	debt,	remedial	
action	needs	 to	be	 taken,	 lest	 the	obligation	 is	 rendered	meaningless.	By	 extension,	 the	 action	




for	 example,	 credit	 agreements	 that	 are	 highly	 prejudicial	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 lender,	 further	
imposing	unconscionable	conditions	that	interfere	with	the	borrower’s	personal	sphere	and	life	
choices	are	contrary	to	public	policy.	Horwood	v.	Millar’s	Timber	and	Trading	Co	Ltd	[1917]	1	KB	












Claims	 that	 seek	 to	 extinguish	 a	 debt,	 wholly	 or	 partially,	 are	 the	most	
common.	 They	 are	 typically	 pursued	 through	 a	 variety	 of	 means,	 such	 as	
unilateral	insolvency,15	unilateral	repudiation	of	the	debt	as	such,	or	repudiation	
of	the	instruments	that	gave	rise	to	the	debt,	such	as	unconscionable	concession	
contracts,	 arbitral	 awards	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 they	 violate	 public	 policy16	and	
others.17	In	 order	 for	 such	 claims	 to	 be	 successful	 it	 must	 be	 demonstrated,	
besides	the	illegal,	odious	or	illegitimate	character	of	the	debt	that	the	borrower	
state	did	not	derive,	nor	will	 it	derive,	any	unjust	rewards	or	benefits	 from	the	
debt	 in	 question.	 Unjust	 enrichment	 is	 primarily	 a	 matter	 of	 fact18	and	 if	 it	 is	
proven	that	such	benefit	has	accrued	to	the	borrowing	state,	it	may	either	be	off-
set	against	its	debt	as	a	whole	or	weaken	its	overall	argument/claim.	
Claims	 that	 seek	 to	 off-set	 parts	 of	 one’s	 debt	 as	 a	 whole	 are	 equally	
legitimate	 subject	 to	 the	 conditions	 stipulated	 in	 the	 previous	 paragraph.	
However,	 several	 considerations	 are	 pertinent.	 A	 set-off	 claim	 is	 essentially	 a	
counter-demand	 by	 A	 against	 a	 claim	 for	 payment	 made	 by	 B	 against	 A.	 By	
means	of	the	set-off	claim,	A	demands	that	B’s	claim	against	him	be	consolidated	
(or	set-off)	against	B’	original	obligation.	Although	the	rationale	underlying	set-
off	 claims	 is	 reasonable	 and	 without	 significant	 hurdles	 in	 the	 context	 of	
litigation,	it	may	be	problematic	in	arbitral	proceedings	where	the	set-off	claim	is	
not	 encompassed	 in	 the	 agreement	 to	 arbitrate.	 If	 the	 lex	 arbitri	 (or	 the	
agreement	to	arbitrate)	does	not	grant	tribunals	authority	to	consolidate	set-off	
	
14	I	 Bantekas,	 Exceptional	 Recognition	 of	 Governments	 and	 Political	 Parties	 in	 respect	 of	
Sovereign	Loans:	The	Greek	case,	(2013)	82	Nordic	J	Int’l	L	317;	KH	Anderson,	International	Law	
and	State	Succession:	A	Solution	to	the	Iraqi	Debt	Crisis?	(2005)	Utah	L	Rev	401.	
15	This	 right	 to	unilateral	 insolvency	 is	 further	 corroborated	by	 the	 ILA’s	 Sovereign	 Insolvency	
Study	 Group	 whose	 2010	 report	 proposed	 four	 policy	 options	 for	 debt	 restructuring,	 one	 of	





17	Bantekas	 has	 identified	 six	 mechanisms	 for	 unilaterally	 repudiating	 odious	 sovereign	 debt,	
namely:	 (a)	 unilateral	 insolvency;	 (b)	 repudiation	 or	 non-enforcement	 of	 arbitral	 awards	 on	
public	 policy	 grounds;	 (c)	 denunciation	 on	 grounds	 of	 executive	 necessity	 and/or	 the	 right	 to	
fiscal/tax	sovereignty;	(d)	direct	unilateral	repudiation	on	the	basis	of	reports	by	national	debt	
audit	committees;	(e)	repudiation	of	contracts	when	creditor/investor	violates	human	rights	and	
of	 unconscionable	 concession	 contracts;	 (f)	 re-negotiation	 of	 bilateral	 investment	 treaties	 and	
concessions.	 See	 I	 Bantekas,	 The	 Right	 to	 Unilateral	 Denunciation	 of	 Odious,	 Illegal	 and	














violation	 of	 international	 law	 (which	 suffices	 if	 it	 was	 incurred	 in	 an	 odious,	






solely	 from	the	actions	of	 the	state	or	 its	 instrumentalities	as	such,	but	also	by	
way	 of	 indirect	 attribution	 from	 the	 actions	 of	 private	 actors	which	 are	 either	
approved	 by	 the	 state	 in	 question,	 or	 in	 respect	 of	 which	 the	 state	 enjoys	
effective	 control.22	A	 (theoretical)	 claim	 for	 redress	 arising	 from	 odious	 debts	
may	include	the	following:	a)	extinction	of	 the	debt;	b)	acknowledgment	that	 it	
never	existed;	 c)	demand	 for	specific	performance,	 such	as	 return	of	 sovereign	
bonds,	 removal	 of	 pertinent	 claims	 before	 courts	 or	 tribunals,	 lifting	 of	
circumstances	 that	 impair	 the	 borrower’s	 international	 creditworthiness	 and	
others.	In	addition	to	these,	it	is	not	out	of	the	question	for	the	claimant	to	seek	
monetary	compensation	for	specific	damage	caused	to	its	finances	as	a	whole	or	
particular	 aspects	 of	 its	 economy.	 By	way	 of	 illustration,	 the	 value	 of	 Greece’s	
sovereign	 bonds	 were	 reduced	 to	 junk	 following	 the	 collapse	 of	 its	 financial	
system	 and	 in	 addition	 it	 was	 forced	 to	 borrow	money	 at	 far	 higher	 rates	 on	
account	 of	 its	 latent	 un-creditworthiness.	Moreover,	 the	 crisis	 culminated	 in	 a	
serious	 under-funding	 of	 its	 healthcare23	and	 the	 rise	 of	 energy	 prices	 that	
resulted	 in	 many	 unnecessary	 deaths	 and	 a	 sharp	 decline	 in	 the	 use	 of	
environmentally	friendly	heating	systems.		
Finally,	 it	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 there	 is	 no	 general	 rule	 under	
international	 law	 as	 regards	 time	 limits	 for	 raising	 sovereign	 claims.	 The	 only	
sensible	limitation	is	that	a	claim	is	time-barred	if	this	was	stipulated	in	a	treaty	
or	private	agreement,	or	if	the	conduct	of	the	claimant	was	such	as	to	give	rise	to	
a	 legitimate	 expectation	 that	 the	 subject-matter	 of	 the	 claim	 was	 no	 longer	
	
19	Art	22	UNCITRAL	Arbitration	Rules.	
20	See	 I	 Bantekas,	 Introduction	to	International	Arbitration	 (Cambridge	University	 Press,	 2015),	
112-13.	
21	See	also	Art	377	Swiss	CCP,	applicable	to	domestic	arbitration,	but	no	reason	why	it	cannot	be	
extended	 to	 international	 arbitration.	 Equally,	 s	 29	 Swedish	AA	 implicitly	 suggests	 that	 set-off	
claims	are	admissible.	Specifically,	it	provides	that	a	claim	invoked	as	a	defence	by	way	of	set	off	
shall	be	adjudicated	in	the	same	award	as	the	main	claim.		
22	Art	 8	 ASR;	Military	and	Paramilitary	Activities	 in	 and	Against	Nicaragua	 (Nicaragua	 v	 USA),	
Merits,	(1986)	ICJ	Rep	14.	
23	Greek	Debt	Committee	preliminary	report,	above	n8,	at	38.	
contested	or	was	otherwise	 satisfied.	The	 latter	 constitutes	 a	 form	of	 conduct-
based	 estoppel	 and	 is	 not	 strictly	 speaking	 concerned	 with	 procedural	 time	
limits	for	bringing	a	claim,	but	is	certainly	relevant	to	this	discussion.		In	the	case	
of	sovereign	debts	the	situation	is	complicated	by	several	factors.	The	first	is	that	
all	 states	are	 indebted	 in	one	way	or	another	 to	private	and	 sovereign	 lenders	
and	that	the	distinction	of	odious	and	lawful	debt	is	indistinguishable.		Moreover,	
in	 order	 to	 dissuade	 borrowers	 from	 raising	 odious	 debt	 claims,	 lenders	
routinely	 renegotiate,	 extinguish,	 re-finance,	 provide	 aid	 or	 enter	 into	 other	
mechanisms	 with	 indebted	 governments.	 In	 this	 manner,	 it	 is	 not	 clear	 if	 the	





determination.	 An	 odious	 debt	 shares	many	 characteristics,	 mutatis	mutandis,	
with	 core	 international	 crimes,	 such	 as	 crimes	 against	 humanity	 and	 genocide,	
namely	 that:	 a)	 the	 illegal	 character	 of	 the	 conduct	 (crime/odiousness)	 is	
objective	 and	 may	 not	 be	 de-characterised	 by	 the	 relevant	 parties	 (i.e.	
victim/perpetrator	or	 lender/borrower);24	b)	 its	objective	 character	and	 its	 jus	
cogens	 nature	means	 that	 it	 is	 not	 subject	 to	prescription	or	 time	 limitations25	
and;	c)	its	subsequent	characterization	as	legitimate	(removal	or	criminalization)	






It	 is	 perhaps	 prudent	 at	 this	 stage	 to	 briefly	 examine	 the	 various	 contours	 of	
odious	debt	and	its	sub-categories.	There	are	several	definitions,	to	be	sure,27	but	








its	 erga	 omnes	 character,	 which	 render	 it	 non-contractual	 (i.e.	 it	 does	 not	 only	 affect	 the	
immediately	 concerned	 parties)	 in	 nature.	Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co Ltd, (Belgium v 
Spain), Merits, [1970] ICJ Rep 44.	
25	See	1968	UN	Convention	on	the	Non-Applicability	of	Statutory	Limitations	to	War	Crimes	and	











which the lender knew or ought to have known, was incurred in violation of democratic principles 
(including consent, participation, transparency and accountability) and used against the best interests of 
the population of the borrower state, or is unconscionable and whose effect is to deny people their 
fundamental civil, political or economic, social and cultural rights.28 
Quite	 clearly,	 the	odious	dimension	of	 a	debt	brings	 into	question	 two	distinct	
but	 inter-related	 elements,	 namely	 its	 unconscionable	 nature	 and	 its	 conflict	
with	fundamental	human	rights.	It	assumes	that	the	very	existence	of	the	state	is	
derived	from	the	will	of	 its	people	and	that	governments	merely	articulate	that	
will	 in	 both	 the	 domestic	 and	 international	 spheres	 as	 representatives	 of	 the	
people.	It	is	a	fundamental	principle	of	representation	or	agency,	that	the	latter	is	
obliged	to	perform	his	duties	in	the	best	interests	of	the	principal.	Consequently,	






the	people	derive	no	benefit	 from	such	a	debt,	 there	 can	be	no	 claim	of	unjust	
enrichment.	 Although	 this	 idea	 of	 odious	 debt,	 which	 is	 predicated	 on	 the	 jus	
cogens	 principle	 of	 economic	 self-determination,	 has	 found	 expression	 in	 the	
work	 of	 truth	 committees	 and	 several	 notable	 arbitral	 awards,29	public	 and	
private	 lenders	 have,	 not	 surprisingly,	 taken	 a	 very	 hostile	 stance	 against	 its	










the	 terms	 and	 conditions	 attached	 to	 that	 loan,	 security	 or	 guarantee	 infringed	 the	 law	 (both	
national	and	international)	or	public	policy,	or	because	such	terms	and	conditions	were	grossly	
unfair,	 unreasonable,	 unconscionable	 or	 otherwise	 objectionable,	 or	 because	 the	 conditions	
attached	 to	 the	 loan,	 security	 or	 guarantee	 included	 policy	 prescriptions	 that	 violate	 national	
laws	or	human	rights	standards,	or	because	the	loan,	security	or	guarantee	was	not	used	for	the	





that	 knowingly	 providing	 a	 loan	 to	 a	 government	 that	 will	 not	 be	 beneficial	 to	 its	 people	
constitutes	a	hostile	act	and	merits	no	entitlement	for	repayment.	
30	Debt	Committee	preliminary	report,	above	n6,	at	10;	see	also	Report	on	Effects	of	Foreign	Debt	




The	 Committee’s	 definition	 was	 dictated	 by	 the	 underlying	 conditions	 of	 the	
Greek	debt	 and	by	 that	 time	 the	 idea	of	 illegitimate	debt	was	more	 theoretical	
than	 practical.	 It	 was	 assumed	 that	 a	 debt	was	 illegitimate	where	 it	 had	 been	
incurred	 legally	but	which	was	 ethically	unconscionable,	whether	procedurally	
or	 substantially.	 As	 will	 be	 demonstrated	 in	 the	 section	 dealing	 with	 the	
economics	 of	 sovereign	 debt,	 the	 potential	 for	 illegitimate	 actions	 is	 much	
broader.	However,	it	suffices	here	to	state	that	it	is	now	well	recognised	that	debt	
constitutes	 a	 policy	 instrument	 to	 the	 same	 degree	 as	 its	 economic	 and	 fiscal	
dimension.31	Borrowing	 states	 may	 incur	 cheap	 debt	 (i.e.	 with	 preferential	
interest	or	long	repayment	periods),	where	available,	for	fungibility	purposes,32	
or	 with	 a	 view	 to	 attracting	 investment	 from	 particular	 countries,	 undertake	
infrastructure	 projects	 that	 secure	 their	 current	 levels	 of	 employment,	 etc.	 On	
the	other	hand,	public	works	or	public-private	partnerships	(PPPs)	are	money-
intensive	 and	 constitute	 the	primary	 financing	projects	 for	 banks,	 hedge	 funds	
and	other	private	 financiers.	They,	 in	 turn,	urge	 industrialised	nations	 to	 lobby	
on	their	behalf	for	funding.	Thereafter,	it	is	in	the	interests	of	the	private	funders	





financing	 system,	 which	 in	 turn	 sustains	 the	 domestic	 job	 market,	 consumer	
spending	 and	 ultimately	 the	 availability	 and	 collection	 of	 taxes.	 As	 a	 result,	




the	 heart	 of	 the	 doctrine	 of	 illegitimate	 debt.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 Greek	 debt,	
illegitimacy	encompassed	both	a	procedural	and	a	substantive	dimension.	As	to	
the	 first,	 Greece’s	 multilateral	 lenders	 entered	 into	 actions	 or	 statements	 that	
either	deteriorated	 the	 country’s	 creditworthiness	–	which	 forced	 it	 to	borrow	
under	higher	interest	rates	or	be	excluded	from	the	private	financing	markets	–	
or	culminated	in	decreasing	the	value	of	 its	sovereign	bonds.33	Moreover,	 these	
very	 statements	 and	 actions	 had	 a	 very	 profound	 effect	 on	 the	 way	 that	 the	
Greek	government	entered	into	negotiations	regarding	the	servicing	of	its	debt,	
as	well	as	 in	 the	way	 that	 the	Greek	people	exercised	 their	democratic	right	 to	
address	 the	 country’s	 debt	 issue.	 	 These	 actions	 have	 been	 held	 to	 constitute	
unilateral	 coercive	 measures.	 Given	 that	 powerful	 creditor	 states	 are	 able	 to	
interfere	in	borrower	states’	constitutional	processes	and	enter	into	statements	
or	 other	 actions	 that	 knowingly	 culminate	 in	 harming	 the	 economy	 of	 the	







34	The	 Final	 Act	 of	 the	 VCLT	 includes	 a	 declaration,	 initially	 tabled	 by	 The	 Netherlands	 (in	
reaction	to	a	request	by	developing	countries	that	consent	to	a	treaty	under	economic	pressure	
economic	 coercion	 qualifies,	 among	 others,	 as	 unlawful	 intervention	 in	 one’s	
domestic	 affairs	which,	 although	does	 not	 invalidate	 consent,	may	nonetheless	
offer	a	basis	for	denouncing	a	loan	agreement	under	Article	56(1)(b)	VCLT.	
	 When	 a	 heavily	 indebted	 country	 is	 under	 severe	 political	 pressure	 to	





also	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 referendum	 of	 July	 2015	where	 the	 Greek	 people	were	
effectively	 asked	 to	 vote	 whether	 they	 accepted	 the	 severe	 conditionalities	




previous	paragraphs	of	 this	 section,	 substantive	 illegitimacy	 concerns	 the	offer	
and	 consideration	 of	 a	 debt	 that	 is	 wholly	 unnecessary.	 The	 UN	 Independent	
Expert	 on	 debt	 and	 human	 rights	 issued	 a	 report	 on	 the	 purchase	 of	 ships	 at	
preferential	 rates	 by	 Ecuador	 in	 the	 1970s,	 financed	 by	 Norwegian	 loans,	
through	an	aid	program.	These	ships	were	of	little,	or	no	use,	to	Ecuador	at	the	
time	and	in	the	process	was	saddled	with	a	significant	debt.	When	interest	rates	
later	 increased	 Ecuador’s	 interest	 obligations	 increased	manifold	 and	 the	 only	
entity	that	made	a	profit	 from	this	arrangement	were	Norwegian	ship	builders.	






Although	 the	 concept	 of	 debt	 illegality	 shares	 some	 common	 features	 with	
odious	and	illegitimate	debt,	it	is	very	much	predicated	on	the	violation	of	laws,	
whether	 domestic	 or	 international	 and	 hence	 is	 easier	 to	 identify.	 The	 Greek	
Truth	Committee	defined	illegal	debt	as:	
	











principles	 of	 sovereign	 equality	 of	 states	 and	 freedom	 of	 consent’	 Draft	 Declaration	 on	 the	
Prohibition	 of	 the	 Threat	 or	 Use	 of	 Economic	 or	 Political	 Coercion	 in	 Concluding	 a	 Treaty,	
adopted	by	the	Conference	without	a	formal	vote.	Draft	Report	of	the	Committee	of	the	Whole	on	




The	 rule	whereby	 states	may	not	 invoke	 their	domestic	 law	as	 justification	 for	
violating	their	obligations	under	international	law37	is	inapplicable	in	situations	
where	 the	 lender	 intended	 to	 violate	 or	 bypass	 fundamental	 provisions	 of	
domestic	law,	particularly	of	a	constitutional	nature,	through	a	debt	instrument	
entered	into	with	the	borrower.	This	is	because	such	an	agreement	violates	the	
principle	 of	 legality,	 fails	 to	 satisfy	 good	 faith	 and	 breaches	 third	 parties’	
legitimate	 expectations.	 Surely,	 the	 superior	 character	 of	 an	 agreement	 under	
international	 law	 was	 not	 meant	 to	 be	 used	 in	 order	 to	 blatantly	 bypass	 and	
violate	fundamental	constitutional	provisions,	breach	human	rights	and	put	third	
parties’	legitimate	expectations	into	doubt.	The	Greek	case	is	emblematic	of	such	
practices	 by	 sovereign	 lenders.	 Under	 articles	 28	 and	 36	 of	 the	 Greek	
Constitution	 all	 international	 agreements	 must	 be	 ratified	 formally	 by	
parliament	 subject	 to	 special	 majorities	 and	 in	 any	 event	 they	 cannot	 violate	
fundamental	 rights	 and	 liberties.	 Following	 the	 debt	 crisis,	 the	 government	
passed	 Law	 3845/2010,	 article	 1(4)	 of	 which	 granted	 the	 Finance	 Minister	
authority	 to	 negotiate	 and	 sign	 the	 texts	 of	 all	 pertinent	 loan	 and	 financing	
agreements	(including	treaties,	contracts	and	MoUs)	but	these	had	to	be	brought	
to	 parliament	 for	 formal	 approval	 and	 ratification	under	normal	 constitutional	
procedures.	 A	 few	 months	 later,	 article	 1(9)	 of	 an	 obscure	 Law	 3847/2010,	
modified	article	1(4)	of	Law	3845	by	stipulating	 that	 the	 term	 'ratification’	 [by	
parliament]	be	replaced	by	'discussion	and	information’.	Moreover,	all	pertinent	
agreements	(irrespective	of	their	legal	nature)	were	declared	as	producing	legal	
effect	 upon	 their	 signature	 by	 the	 Minister.	 Hence,	 articles	 28	 and	 36	 of	 the	






When	 trying	 to	 convince	 one’s	 audience	 that	 a	 particular	 international	 law	
principle	 that	 is	 absent	 in	 treaty	 law	 really	 exists	 scholars	 typically	 turn	 to	
customary	 law	and	attempt	 to	 furnish	as	many	 instances	of	 state	practice	 they	
can	possibly	 find.38	This	 is	not	 the	case	with	odious	debt.	 It	has	sparingly	been	
claimed	 and	 even	 less	 so	 recognised	 and	 declared	 to	 govern	 the	 relations	
between	a	 sovereign	borrower	and	 its	 lenders.39	The	reason	 for	 the	absence	of	
concrete	state	practice	lies	in	the	disincentive	of	lending	nations	and	institutions	
in	allowing	their	borrowing	counterparts	from	making	any	direct	claims	before	
judicial	 or	 arbitral	 fora	 –	 or	 indeed	 in	 the	 form	 of	 extra-judicial	 unilateral	
measures	–	for	the	simple	fact	that	it	would	give	rise	to	a	particular	state	practice	
that	they	deem	undesirable.40	It	is	largely	for	this	reason	that	lending	states	have	






40	See	 S	 Ambrose,	 Sovereign	 Debt	 Restructuring:	 Social	 Movements	 and	 the	 Politics	 of	 Debt	
Cancellation.	(2005)	6	Chi.	J.	Int'l	L	267.	
bilateral	 or	 multilateral	 agreements	 towards	 debt	 alleviation.41	Whatever	 the	
method,	 the	 objective	 always	 remains	 the	 same.	 Even	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Greece	
whereby	 the	Tsipras	 government	 sought	 a	 renegotiation	 of	 the	 country’s	 debt,	
the	very	utterance	of	odious	debt	was	never	made.	In	fact,	when	the	government	
had	 a	 change	 of	 heart	 following	 the	 referendum	 of	 July	 2015	 it	 decided	 to	
disband	 the	 parliamentary	 debt	 committee,	 which	 was	 the	 only	 entity	 in	
government	describing	part	of	the	debt	as	odious.	
	 Notwithstanding	 such	 intentional	 silencing,	 the	 very	 fact	 that	 it	 is	
undertaken	by	lending	nations	in	order	to	suspend	another	non-desired	practice,	
clearly	 suggests	 that	 the	 non-desired	 practice	 encompasses	 a	 critical	 mass	 of	
opinio	 juris.	 In	 international	 law	 a	 customary	 rule	may	well	 develop	 –	 and	 its	
existence	accordingly	proven	–	not	only	by	means	of	positive	practice,	but	also	a	
uniform	 and	 sustained	 opinio	 juris.	 If	 this	 was	 not	 so,	 countries	 unable	
(technologically,	 financially,	politically	or	otherwise)	 to	undertake	positive	acts	
would	 always	 be	 excluded	 from	 rule-creation.	 Such	 an	 eventuality	 would	 be	
wholly	antithetical	 to	 the	 jus	cogens	 rule	of	 states’	 juridical	 equality	and	would	
render	a	handful	of	states	global	legislators.	It	must	of	course	be	shown	that	the	




and	 lenders	 try	 to	 avert	 unilateral	 sovereign	 insolvency	 as	 a	 legal	 possibility,	
despite	 the	 fact	 that	 unilateral	 insolvency	was	 pretty	much	 extensive	 right	 up	
until	 World	War	 II.44	In	 equal	 measure,	 developing	 states	 strive,	 although	 not	




	 Finally,	 the	 rise	 of	 human	 rights,	 both	 in	 treaty	 and	 customary	 form,	
clearly	 give	 rise	 to	 a	 duty	 to	 construe	 debt	 arrangements	 from	 the	 lens	 of	
individual	freedoms	and	corresponding	state	obligations.	Where	the	repayment	
of	 a	 debt	 jeopardises	 or	 in	 fact	 culminates	 in	 unnecessary	 infantile	 deaths,	
malnourishment,	 the	 spread	 of	 diseases,	widespread	 poverty,	 lack	 of	 access	 to	
essential	services,	education	and	a	violation	of	other	civil	and	political	and	socio-
economic	 rights	 the	 arrangements	 in	 question	 are	 problematic.	 States,	 both	
lenders	 and	 borrowers,	 are	 under	 an	 obligation	 to	 conduct	 their	 international	




later.	 See	 Truth	 Committee	 on	 Public	 Debt,	 Illegitimacy,	 Illegality,	 Odiousness	 and	
Unsustainability	of	August	2015	MoU	and	Loan	Agreement	(September	2015),	available	at:	





44	See	 M	 Waibel,	 Sovereign	 Defaults	 before	 International	 Courts	 and	 Tribunals	 (Cambridge	 UP,	
2011).	
45	UN	Guiding	 Principles	 on	 Foreign	Debt	 and	Human	Rights,	 UN	Doc	A/HRC/20/23	 (10	April	
2011).	
would	 immediately	 relegate	 human	 rights	 law	 to	 a	 lex	specialis	 regime	 that	 is	
fragmented	from	and	unrelated	to	the	other	obligations	of	states.46		
	 The	practice	of	the	ECB	and	the	EC	Commission	in	the	course	of	the	Greek	
debt	 crisis	 and	 their	 lending	 to	 Greece	 demonstrates	 a	 clear	 will	 to	 operate	
outside	 EU	 law.	 There	 are	 several	 reasons	 for	 this,	 such	 as	 the	 avoidance	 of	
human	 rights	 obligations	 under	 Article	 51	 of	 the	 EU	 Charter	 of	 Fundamental	
Rights	(CFR)	or	the	promotion	of	human	dignity,	freedoms	and	democracy	under	
Articles	 2	 and	 3	 of	 the	 TEU,	 as	 well	 as	 Article	 9	 TEFEU.	 The	 European	
Commission,	 for	 example,	 in	 discharging	 the	 role	 assigned	 to	 it	 under	 the	
Intercreditor	Agreement	of	8	May	2010,	acting	under	Articles	126(9)	and	136	of	
the	TFEU,	 should	 have	 required	Greece	 to	 take	measures	 for	 deficit	 reduction,	
but	 these	 should	 have	 been	 demanded	 within	 the	 framework	 of	 the	 CFR.	 As	
regards	 the	second	rescue	plan	presented	 to	Greece,	which	was	 launched	after	













a	 developed	 economy	 in	 the	 eurozone.	 If	 this	 is	 coupled	 with	 a	 decent	 credit	
rating,	 particularly	where	 a	 state	 pays	 its	monthly	 debt	 arrears	 in	 time	 and	 is	
considered	 creditworthy,	 the	 interest	 charged	 for	 its	 borrowing	 will	 remain	
comparatively	low.	When	such	creditworthiness	exists	and	a	country	maintains	a	
small	deficit	that	is	counter-balanced	by	a	manageable	debt-to-GDP	ratio	(i.e.	the	
total	 amount	 of	 public	 debt	 as	 juxtaposed	 to	 the	 GDP),	 the	 total	 amount	 of	 a	
country’s	overall	debt	does	not	lead	to	a	debt	crisis;	otherwise,	it	risks	exclusion	
from	 the	 private	 lending	markets	 and	 subsequently	 the	 value	 of	 its	 sovereign	
bonds	will	be	reduced	to	junk.		
For	reasons	that	will	become	evident	below,	the	Greek	Statistical	Agency	
intentionally	 falsified	 the	 country’s	 debt	 figures	 in	 2009	 by	 discovering	




46	This	 debate	 is	 acute	 in	 the	 field	 of	 foreign	 investment	 law.	 Even	 so,	 the	 new	 generation	 of	
bilateral	 investment	 treaties	(BITs),	 such	as	 the	preamble	and	Art	3(1)	of	 the	2015	Norwegian	
Model	 BIT	 insert	 human	 rights	 clauses	 and	 investment	 tribunals	 recognize	 the	 importance	 of	










and	 the	 value	 of	 its	 sovereign	 bonds	 was	 equally	 reduced	 to	 junk.	 Before	 the	
circulation	of	the	preliminary	report	of	the	Greek	Parliament’s	Truth	Committee	
on	Public	Debt	in	June	2015,	it	was	globally	assumed	that	Greece’s	debt	was	the	
result	 of	 lavish	 public	 expenditures	 and	 living	 ‘beyond	 one’s	 means’.	 The	
Committee	dispelled	this	myth	and	demonstrated	how	the	debt	had	really	been	
accumulated.	
It	 was	 found	 that	 Greece’s	 public	 debt	 had	 remained	 more	 or	 less	 the	
same	from	1993	to	2009.49	In	fact,	2/3	of	the	debt’s	rise	is	attributable	to	interest	
payments	alone	(simple	and	compound).	Public	expenditures	during	this	period	
were	 lower	 in	 Greece	 than	 in	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 eurozone,	 with	 the	 exception	 of	
defence	 expenditures.50	However,	 what	 was	 less	 noticeable	 was	 that	 between	
2000	and	2009	there	was	a	sharp	rise	in	private	debt.	This	private	debt-to-GDP	
ratio	 reached	 its	 peak	 at	 129	 per	 cent	 in	 2009.	 Hence,	 Greek	 and	 European	






lenders	 are	 equally	 exposed	 to	 its	 losses.	 The	 same	 is	 true	 of	 its	 insurers	 and	
hence	 the	 prospect	 of	 contagion	 is	 clear.	 For	 the	 country	 whose	 banks	 are	
exposed	to	huge	losses,	in	addition	to	the	typical	re-capitalisation	of	such	banks	
through	 taxpayer	 funds,	 there	 is	 also	 a	 loss	 of	 trust	 in	 the	 state	 in	 the	
international	 financial	 markets	 and	 a	 rise	 in	 its	 spreads	 (effectively,	 its	
borrowing	capacity).		
It	is	at	this	point	that	the	kleptocracy	kicks	in.	As	the	Committee	pointed	





be	 forced	 out	 of	 international	 lending	 markets	 and	 thus	 go	 under	 fiscal	
supervision	by	the	IMF	and	the	ECB,	and	rely	on	both	multilateral	and	bilateral	
creditors.	 Their	 ultimate	 purpose	 was	 to	 buy	 some	 time	 so	 that	 they	 (the	
sovereign	 states)	 could	purchase	all	 this	private	debt	 incurred	by	 their	private	
banks.	Once	they	did	so,	the	otherwise	private	(bank)	debt	that	was	now	in	their	












The	 imposition	 of	 the	 most	 austere	 conditionalities	 ever	 witnessed	 and	 an	
economic	 occupation	 of	 the	 country.	 Did	 they	 work?	 The	 austerity	 measures	
imposed	 upon	 the	 Greek	 people	 not	 only	 failed	 to	 increase	 productivity	 and	









facilities	 for	 the	Greek	debt,	 it	was	pointed	out	 that	 the	Greek	debt	was	clearly	
unsustainable	 from	 the	 outset.	 The	 restructuring	 of	 the	 debt	 recommended	by	




was	 to	 save	 several	 private	 banks	 in	 Europe.55	In	 this	 scheme,	 fundamental	
human	 rights	 played	 no	 role	 whatsoever.56	It	 is	 not	 surprising,	 therefore,	 that	
under	the	weight	of	this	evidence,	the	Truth	Committee	on	the	Public	Debt	found	
this	part	of	Greece’s	debt	to	be	odious,	illegal	and	illegitimate.57	It	is	telling	that	
the	 representative	 of	 Greece	 to	 the	 IMF	 during	 2010-12	 under	 (public)	
questioning	 from	the	Committee	stated	that	 the	 IMF	held	 training	seminars	 for	








an	 international	 court	 or	 tribunal.	 The	 only	 potential	 fora	 that	 could	 entertain	
such	a	claim	are	the	International	Court	of	Justice	(ICJ)	and	investment	tribunals	
under	 the	 1965	 International	 Convention	 on	 the	 Settlement	 of	 Investment	
Disputes	between	States	and	Nationals	of	Other	States	(ICSID).	58	This	is	because	
the	 parties	 submitting	 disputes	 to	 both	 of	 these	 only	 rarely	 restrict	 their	
applicable	 law,	 whereas	 it	 is	 unlikely	 that	 the	 parties	 (sovereign	 and	 private	
lenders)	to	a	debt	dispute	will	opt	for	ad	hoc	or	institutional	arbitration	through	










doctrine.	 Even	 so,	 courts	 and	 tribunals,	 depending	 on	 their	mandate,	 need	not	
specifically	spell	out	debt	odiousness,	but	can	simply	rely	on	states’	obligation	to	
protect	 and	 uphold	 fundamental	 human	 rights	 above	 other	 politico-financial	
considerations	to	the	contrary.59	
	 We	have	determined	in	this	article	that	the	range	of	unconscionable	debts	
encompassed	 under	 the	 umbrella	 term	 of	 odious	 debt	 is	 meaningful	 in	




as	 a	 sovereign	 entitlement	 against	 the	 country’s	 lenders,	 whether	 public	 or	
private.	Given	that	odious	debt	violates	economic	self-determination	which	itself	
is	 a	 collective	 entitlement	 that	 is	 delegated	 to	 a	 representative	 of	 the	 people	
(typically	its	government_	–	but	exercisable	on	their	behalf	and	for	their	benefit	–	
it	 is	 evident	 that	 it	 is	 not	 subject	 to	 the	 rule	 of	 government	 continuity	 and	
succession	 under	 international	 law.	 As	 a	 result,	 if	 a	 government	 conspires	 to	
transform	private	 debt	 into	 sovereign	debt,	 its	 successor	 (or	 the	people	 of	 the	
country	in	question)	is	not	responsible	for	the	repayment	of	said	debt.	The	debt	




and	may	be	exercised	with	a	view	to	 the	partial	or	 total	extinction	of	 the	debt,	
acknowledgment	 of	 non-existence	 (declaratory	 relief),	 demand	 for	 specific	
performance,	or	other.	The	claim	is	legitimate	only	if	the	indebted	state	has	not	
become	 unjustifiably	 richer	 or	 become	 the	 beneficiary	 of	 an	 undue	 advantage.	
Where	a	 legitimate	odious	debt	 claim	 is	 found	 to	exist,	 it	may	be	declared	and	
acted	upon	unilaterally.	This	means	that	no	acceptance	need	be	sought	from	the	
country’s	 creditors,	 although	 undoubtedly	 this	 will	 give	 rise	 to	 considerable	
friction	and	may	be	 followed	by	a	series	of	countermeasures.	Unilateral	odious	
debt	 declarations	 may	 involve	 debt	 denunciation,	 elimination	 of	 debt	 from	
national	budget,	non-payment	of	arrears,	confiscation	or	attachment	of	lender’s	
assets,	judicial	proceedings	against	lenders	and	others.	
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